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USING LAW AND LAW ENFORCEMENT TO PREVENT
VIOLENCE AND PROMOTE COMMUNITY VIBRANCY
NEAR BARS, CLUBS, AND TAVERNS
SHAWN MONTERASTELLI*
INTRODUCTION
Violence is more than a threat to community order. It is a
threat to community health. It is the principal cause of death
among young people and destroys important "quality years of
life."1 In this Note, I take the reader step by step through the
problems with violence as viewed by current sociological litera-
ture and then describe effective strategies for tackling these
problems in ways that not only prevent violence from occurring
but also promote the overall vibrancy within the community. My
goal in this Note is to provide city officials with a general frame-
work that can be applied to any city should they recognize that
violence is occurring in and around their bars, clubs, or taverns.
The following paragraph provides a brief outline of this
Note. In Part I, I discuss the high and extensive costs of crime in
a community. While many of these costs are readily apparent to
most community members, the costs of violence reach far
beyond the pocketbook. In Part II, I compare the public health
and criminal justice models of violence prevention. City officials
could best tackle their problems with violence if they pulled from
the strengths of these approaches rather than placing them in
opposition. In Part III, I explain why bars, taverns, and clubs play
a significant role in violence in American cities. In Part IV, I
discuss the integral part that the city must play in battling the
national problem of violence. In Part V, I explain several effec-
tive programs in which the police themselves should participate.
* B.A., 1999, University of Missouri-Columbia, J.D. Candidate, 2002,
Notre Dame Law School; Thomas J. White Scholar, 2000-2002. I dedicate this
Note to the community where I will someday call "home." I am grateful for
those people who have inspired me to look at life through the lens of faith and
morality, and I appreciate the effort of the people who volunteered their time
and talents in order to help me publish this Note.
1. Mark H. Moore, Public Health and Criminal Justice Approaches to Preven-
tion, 19 CRIME & JusT. 237, 240 (citing Mark L. Rosenberg et al., Interpersonal
Violence: Homicide and Spouse Abuse, in PUB. HEALTH & PREVENTVE MED.
1399-400 (John M. Last ed., 12th ed. 1986)) [hereinafter Moore, Approaches to
Prevention].
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While more police and more arrests may be a common sense
reaction to violence, police should play an integral part in work-
ing with the community to prevent violence by focusing on "hot
spots" of violence near bars, clubs, and taverns. In Part VI, I
explain how city officials should use the law to target "hot spot"
bars, clubs, and taverns. In Part VII, I explain that fear of vio-
lence displacement and weak research prevent cities from creat-
ing effective violence prevention programs. In Part VIII, I
explain the importance of balancing regulation and enforce-
ment with the desire to create vibrant communities and promote
human dignity.
I. THE COSTS OF HEALING THE WOUNDS OF VIOLENCE2
Violent crime' wounds a community. Attackers both physi-
cally and psychologically wound the individual victims of violent
crime. From bruising and bleeding to fear and distress, the vic-
tims of violence suffer from a very powerful trauma. The larger
community suffers not only from the harm done to one of its
members but also from the very infiltration of violence into their
society. The community loses a certain amount of safety and
peace, and such violence may damage the community's overall
vibrancy.
The most damaging wound of violent crime is fear.4 Gener-
ally, the public finds crimes resulting in physical injury to victims
worse and more reprehensible than those producing only prop-
erty loss.5 One 1985 study, randomly sampling 60,000 Ameri-
cans' responses to 204 various criminal scenarios, found that
respondents believed that demanding $10 from a person and
then shooting and wounding that person was almost 10 times as
serious as breaking into a parking meter to steal $10 worth of
2. For a more thorough analysis of many of the costs associated with vio-
lent crime, see Mark A. Cohen et al., The Costs and Consequences of Violent Behav-
ior in the United States, in 4 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 67, 67
(AlbertJ. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993).
3. By violent crime, I am referring to homicide, rape, aggravated assault,
battery, and robbery.
4. Mark Warr, Public Perceptions and Reactions to Violent Offending and Vic-
timization, in 4 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 1, 3 (AlbertJ. Reiss,
Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993) (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY (1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION] ("The most damag-
ing of the effects of violent crime is fear, and that fear must not be belittled.")).
5. See generally Warr, supra note 4 (measuring and quantifying the fear
caused by certain crimes by analyzing several studies that demonstrate the per-
ceived risk and perceived seriousness of those crimes).
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nickels.6 Thus, even if the vandalism of parking meters occurs
more often than a shooting, the shooting is more likely to have a
greater impact on the community.
The media attention given to violent crime is another signifi-
cant factor contributing to this unbalanced level of fear. The
media provides one of our society's most important sources of
our public information on crime.' Because of the virtually
unlimited supply of crime stories, reporters must choose which
crime events to cover. The seriousness of the crime is an impor-
tant standard in determining a story's newsworthiness.8 The
story may be even more newsworthy because of its rarity. By
using these standards, "the media are most likely to report pre-
cisely the crimes that are least likely to occur."' Consequently,
violent crimes receive higher ratings than the other various crim-
inal scenarios in both perceived seriousness and perceived risk.1 °
Because of these perceptions, violent crimes are more likely to
instill fear in a community than are property crimes.
Perceived risk of violence also affects a community's
response to violent crimes. Community members tend to be
more fearful of certain areas in a city. 1 Certain areas may be
plagued by acts of extreme violence or by higher proportions of
violent crime than other areas. As these acts of violence 4re pub-
licized either by the media or by word of mouth, the areas where
the acts occurred come to be known as dangerous parts of the
city.
6. See id. at 38-45 (citing M. E. WotGANG, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF
CRIME SEVERITY (1985), whose survey's results ranked all 204 offenses according
to their level of perceived seriousness). The seriousness scale ranged from
72.1, for a person who plants a bomb in a public building that kills 20 people,
to 0.2, for a person under the age of 16 playing hooky from school. Id. The
parking meter crime received a 1.6, while the injurious $10 robbery at gunpoint
received a score of 15.7. Id. at 40-45. Equally interesting, respondents believed
breaking into a bank at night and stealing $100,000 was relatively as serious as
the $10 robbery, receiving a score of 15.5. See id. at 40.
7. See Terance D. Miethe, Fear and Withdrawal from Urban Life, 539 THE
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POUrrIcAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 14, 16
(1995).
8. See id.
9. Id. at 16. Additionally, "[r] esearch that compares official rates of crime
in a city with media coverage reveals that violent crimes, especially murder, are
drastically overrepresented in media accounts, given their frequency of actual
occurrence." Id. at 17.
10. See WOLFGANG, supra note 6, at 40-45.
11. See id. at 15 ("There is strong evidence that people commonly per-
ceive crime in geographic terms, meaning that they typify areas as dangerous
or, alternatively, as safe zones.").
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This localization of fear causes avoidance behaviors. "Avoid-
ance behaviors are those actions 'taken to decrease exposure to
crime by removing oneself from or increasing the distance from
situations in which the risk of criminal victimization is believed to
be high."'12 In fact, spatial avoidance is among the most com-
mon responses to fear of crime in the United States.'
3
This avoidance behavior can manifest itself when individuals
avoid certain places or activities at particular times. For example,
a person might take a taxi instead of riding the public transit,
especially if the person is traveling at night. Such perceptions
are also likely to deter individuals from coming out of their
homes or taking late-night walks. "By avoiding physical contact
with risky situations and risky people, individuals decrease their
risks of criminal victimization ... .'"4 Such avoidance creates yet
another "wound" of violent crime.
Healing these "wounds" of violence is an expensive part of
the nation's overall health bill. 5 In general, individual victims of
violent crime pay expensive hospital bills, replace damaged prop-
erty, and suffer lost wages or lost days in school. 6 The larger
community also pays for violent crime through increased costs
for health and life insurance; criminal justice and deterrence
measures; victim services; and crime and violence research pro-
grams.17 Indirectly, the community "pays" for violence by way of
the increased fear for potential victims; lost freedom for offend-
ers; trauma to victims and witnesses; indictment and possible
conviction of innocent individuals; and a lost tax base for victims,
offenders, and their families.' 8 Considering the high cost of
healing the damage caused by violent crimes, Part II discusses
two popular models of violent crime prevention.
12. Id. at 20 (quoting F. DuBow, REACTIONS TO CRIME 31 (1979)).
13. Id. at 21 (citing several studies where a significant majority of respon-
dents reported that they avoid certain places in the city).
14. Miethe, supra note 7, at 22.
15. See Cohen et al., supra note 2, at 67-68. Despite limitations in retriev-
ing actual aggregate costs of injuries from only and all violent crime, a 1989
study estimates the total costs of injuries, including the lifetime cost of treat-
ment, rehabilitation, lost productivity, pain and suffering, and lost quality of life
at $1.1 trillion. Id. at 90. These estimates do not include the mental health
care costs due to post-traumatic stress disorder. See id.
16. See id.
17. See generally id. (discussing the specific cost of violence throughout the
article).
18. See generally i&
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II. CRIMINAL JUSTICE VS. PUBLIc HEALTH
High costs of violent crime contribute to the community's
desire for prevention. The sociological community has devel-
oped two general approaches to crime prevention: the criminal
justice model and the public health model. The criminal justice
model of crime prevention focuses its attention on deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation of the offender.1 9 Many crimi-
nal justice practitioners see the evil intentions of offenders as the
primary empirical cause of violence.2" "In this view, if the offend-
ers had not gotten angry, or if they were not so vicious and ruth-
less, the violent offenses would not have been committed."2 1 The
criminal justice model, then, generally responds to these contrib-
uting factors by increasing the number of law enforcement
officers, placing violent offenders in jail for longer periods, and
attempting to temper the offenders' violent natures.
For example, the criminal law usually punishes violent
crimes more harshly than property crimes. In 1996, the violent
offenders received on average seventy-eight months of incarcera-
tion from state courts while property offenders received on aver-
age thirty months of incarceration from those courts.2 2 Even the
lowest violent offenses category (aggravated assault) received a
greater sentence, on average, than the highest property offenses
category (burglary).21 "[S]o strong is the relation between pre-
ferred punishment and perceived seriousness that the two are
sometimes regarded as substitutable if not outright identical vari-
ables."24 In this way, violent crimes, as compared to property
crimes, are more likely to receive prison sentences and for longer
terms.
19. Mark H. Moore et al., Violence and Intentional Injuries: Criminal Justice
and Public Health Perspectives on an Urgent National Problem, in 4 UNDERSTANDING
AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 167, 168 (Albert J. Reiss Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds.,
1993) [hereinafter Moore et al., Public Health Perspectives].
20. MARK H. MOORE ET AL., DANGEROUS OFFENDERS 24-30 (1984) [herein-
after MOORE ET AL., DANGEROUS OFFENDERS]. While Moore concedes that
"crimes may be caused by factors other than the evil intentions of bad people,"
his book focuses on the empirical theory that "dangerous offenders are a note-
worthy component of the crime problem." Id. at 25.
21. Moore, Approaches to Prevention, supra note 1, at 243.
22. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1996 at 3, tbl.3 (1999).
23. Id. While burglary's average sentence was forty-one months, aggra-
vated assault averaged forty-three months. Id. A contributing factor to this dis-
parity in sentencing, other than perceived seriousness, may also be the
increased ability to provide restitution for property offenses.
24. Warr, supra note 4, at 49 (citing several studies as authority for this
position).
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In contrast to the criminal justice model that focuses on
attacking and removing each individual "virus" that has infected
the community, the public health model of crime prevention
focuses on reducing the external risk factors that create opportu-
nity and capacity for violent criminal activity by preventing the
"virus" from being able to attack the community in the first
place.25 This model is based on four steps: 1) public health sur-
veillance, 2) risk group identification, 3) risk factor exploration,
and 4) program implementation and evaluation.26
"Perhaps the most difficult step in this analytic process is the
third: the search for potentially modifiable risk factors for inten-
tional injuries. '27 Such risk factors, known as "criminogenic fea-
tures," include, among others, the presence and availability of
guns and alcohol, 28 crowded bars with minimal police pres-
ence, 29 dimly lit areas around subway stops, and cash machines
along a crowded street.3" The public health model even looks at
young persons as a criminogenic feature, as they are more likely
to be "nudged onto tracks that cause them to become youthful
offenders or easy victims of others."' Such features produce
crimes "not only because they attract people who were already
motivated to offend, but also because they facilitate the commis-
sion of crimes by people who were less committed to criminal
offending."32
Like the criminal justice model, the public health model of
crime prevention also reacts to violence that has already
occurred. Unlike the criminal justice model, the public health
model focuses on healing the wounds of violence because of its
perception that violence is a disease that is difficult to contain.
In turn, the public health approach emphasizes the importance
of healing the individual victim's physical and emotional wounds
and reestablishing the victim's and offender's connection to one
another and to the community. This approach is designed to
25. See Moore, Approaches to Prevention, supra note 1, at 244-45.
26. See Moore et al., Public Health Perspectives, supra note 19, at 183.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 190.
29. See Moore, Approaches to Prevention, supra note 1, at 246.
30. See id. at 189.
31. Id. at 245.
32. Moore et al., Public Health Perspectives, supra note 19, at 189. These
factors do not, in and of themselves, actually cause violence. These factors "pro-
duce" violence by facilitating such activity. See Robert J. Sampson & Janet L.
Lauritson, Violent Victimization and Offending: Individual-, Situational-, and Com-
munity-Level Risk Factors, in 3 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 1, 37
(AlbertJ. Reiss, Jr. &Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993).
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prevent the spread of more violence.33 As stated in Part I, vio-
lence causes fear and disconnection that in turn allows violence
to spread more easily. This spread occurs because violence, par-
ticularly among strangers, spreads fear more widely as people
generally have no control or knowledge of the strangers that pass
in and out of their lives every day. Thus, the public health
approach can be extended to include not only the reconnection
of the victim and offender, as in the case of acquaintance crime,
but the reconnection of all "infected" individuals 3 4 to the com-
munity at-large. This reconnection not only reacts to the wounds
of violence but also prevents future occurrences of the same.
Not only does the public health model seek to prevent vio-
lence by preventing the spread of the disease, but it also seeks to
make individuals less susceptible to the occurrence of violence.
In this way, the public health approach may also be more effec-
tive than the criminal justice model in preventing crime.
Whereas the criminal justice model might prevent crime by put-
ting more police in high crime areas, the public health model
seeks creative solutions to reduce the opportunity and capacity of
potential offenders to commit violent acts.
First, the public health approach seeks to prevent "first
offenses." "Preventing a first offense may be important not only
to avoid the loss to a victim but also to prevent an individual from
becoming an offender."35 The public health approach seeks to
interrupt the processes that produce offenders.
Second, the public health approach seeks to find simple
technological manipulations that would make the person and
the environment less vulnerable to violence. For example, the
public health approach might attack violence in bars by substitut-
ing plastic cups for traditional bar mugs to reduce some of the
damage that emerges from drunken fights. 36 Other more expen-
sive proposals to make cities more violence resistant include
efforts to reduce population density, to reduce the overall num-
ber of bars and liquor stores in a community, or to create "defen-
sible spaces" through more effective surveillance and response
systems that mobilize police agencies. Using the basic theory of
both violent crime prevention models, Part III discusses how
33. See Moore, Approaches to Prevention, supra note 1, at 241.
34. These individuals include the victim, offender, families, friends, and
any person whose fear and distrust of members of their community grows as a
result of the violent act.
35. Moore, Approaches to Prevention, supra note 1, at 251.
36. Id. at 245.
37. Id. at 253 (quoting OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: CRIME PREVEN-
TION THROUGH URBAN DESIGN (1972)).
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targeting areas around bars, clubs, and taverns can be an effec-
tive means to prevent future violent crimes.
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BARS, TAvERNs, AND CLUBS
Both the public health and criminal justice models of crime
prevention agree that attacking certain areas in a city is an effec-
tive way to prevent violent crime. 8 Empirical evidence demon-
strates that most crime is highly concentrated in and around a
relatively small number of places, much like a disease attacks a
body. 9 Furthermore, numerous situational factors contribute to
a high crime rate in a particular area.4" Specifically among
drinking establishments, a national study concluded that most
tavern-related violence usually occurs in only a few of a city's
bars.41 In a localized case study of an area on the northside of
Chicago, researchers found that "tavern density and proximity to
mass-transit stops played roles in creating hot spots [of crime] ."42
Unfortunately, many national and local criminal policies of law
and prevention have yet to focus their attention on specific
places and situations." Very little place-focused prevention
research has been conducted by any organization to date. On
the other hand, law enforcement agencies have recently paid
more attention to places and "hot spots" of crime.4 4
38. Just as the criminal justice model might have police patrol a certain
"diseased" area in a city, the public health model might focus on reducing fear
and disconnection in that area.
39. See Moore et al., Public Health Perspectives, supra note 19 at 189 ("Simi-
larly, researchers and the police have discovered that criminal incidents tend to
cluster in particular locations (defined in terms of both time and space).").
40. See Ralph B. Taylor, Crime and Small-Scale Places: What We Know, What
We Can Prevent, and What Else We Need to Know, in NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND PLACE: PLENARY PAPERS OF THE 1997 CONFERENCE
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION 1, 13 (1998).
41. John E. Eck, Preventing Crime at Places, in UNIV. OF MD., DEP'T OF CRIM-
INOLOGY & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T,
WHAT'S PROMISING 7-1, 7-1 (1997) (citing Lawrence W. Sherman et al., HIGH
CRIME TAVERNS: A RECAP PROJECr IN PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (1992)).
42. Taylor, supra note 40, at 10 (citing R.L. Block & C.R. Block, Space,
Place, and Crime: Hot Spot Areas and Hot Places of Liquor-Related Crime, in CRIME
PLACE 145 (.E. Eck & D. Weisbud eds., 1995)).
43. Eck, supra note 41, at 7-2 ("[T]he Office of Justice Programs has
funded very few explicit place-focused programs or tests of place-focused
prevention.").
44. See Taylor, supra note 40, at 1. Also, the "Spatial and Temporal Analy-
sis of Crime (STAC), developed by researchers at the Illinois Criminal Justice
Authority, is probably one of the most widely used crime mapping programs, in
part because it is free." Id. at 6.
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"In 1996, Congress required the Attorney General to pro-
vide a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of over $3
billion granted annually by the Department ofJustice ... to assist
state and local law enforcement and community efforts in
preventing crime."45 "The Assistant Attorney General for the
Office of Justice Programs asked the National Institute of Justice
... to commission an independent review of the relevant scien-
tific literature."46 Of the ninety-nine site-specific intervention
programs examined by the commission, thirty-one studies
involved violent crime.47 From this research, the commission pri-
marily concluded that "[s]ubstantial reductions in national rates
of serious crime can only be achieved by prevention in areas of
concentrated poverty, where the majority of all homicides in the
nation occur, and where homicide rates are 20 times the national
average."48 At the same time, the report concluded that "[t] he
effectiveness of most crime prevention strategies will remain
unknown until the nation invests more in evaluating them."49
Despite these limitations, the commission drew a few promising
conclusions from their research. 0
The 1997 Report found that preventing criminal opportuni-
ties is one of the most immediate ways to prevent crime at places:
If offenders pay closer attention to the situation immedi-
ately before them than to the uncertain long term risks of
their behavior, then it is quite possible that prevention at
places may have a greater impact on offending than
45. Lawrence W. Sherman, An Overview, in UNIV. OF MD., DEP'T OF CRIMI-
NOLOGY & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WAT DOESN'T,
WHAT's PROMISING V, V (1997) [hereinafter Sherman, Overview].
46. Id.
47. Eck, supra note 41, at 7-4, fig.7-1.
48. Sherman, Overview, supra note 45, at v.
49. Lawrence W. Sherman, Conclusion: The Effectiveness of Local Crime Pre-
vention Funding, in UNIV. OF MD., DEP'T OF CRIMINOLOGY & CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING 10-1, 10-1
(1997). Because Congress only allowed nine months for a comprehensive sci-
entific review of crime prevention programs, the report relied heavily on its
review of other recently completed reviews that the committee found to be gen-
erally reliable. Primary evaluation was reserved for only the highest priority
program areas. In secondary reviews, the commission reviewed the studies sam-
ple size, presence of comparison groups, use of control variables, variable mea-
surement, control for effects of attrition from study, post-treatment
measurement period, use of statistical significance tests, and overall evaluation
methodology. See Lawrence W. Sherman & Denise Gottfredson, Appendix:
Research Methods, in UNIV. OF MD., DEP'T OF CRIMINOLOGY & CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING A-1, A-1
(1997).
50. See generally Eck, supra note 41.
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increases in penalties or less tangible increases in risks
(e.g., decreases in police response time, increased police
presence, or greater numbers of arrests and convictions). 5
In this way, violence prevention programs that focus on "places"
or "situations" assume that "offenders are rational, motivated by
potential benefits, are aware of likely crime costs and recognize
opportunities for getting away with a crime."5 2 Like washing
your hands before eating dinner to prevent bacteria from being
ingested and causing sickness, opportunity blocking is an effec-
tive means to eliminate the temptation for potential offenders to
commit violent crimes.
Bars, clubs, and taverns are especially vulnerable to criminal
opportunity. The patrons of such businesses are likely to be car-
rying cash and may also be intoxicated. Researchers in Cleveland
found that "items of value ... can become available, visible, and
accessible as individuals are going to or from such businesses and
their inertia in terms of resisting crime or escaping may [be] low-
ered."5 3 Intoxicated individuals also have weaker internal social
controls that may contribute to the ease by which they get into an
argument that escalates into some kind of physical altercation.5 4
The businesses themselves are also likely to have "cash on
hand and have desirable goods, which can be consumed directly
or easily sold."55 These businesses are often accessible to the
general "of age" public and attract the potential patrons with
large, glowing signs.56 They also draw their patrons from areas
outside of the immediate neighborhood. With the presence of
more people, most of them strangers, the anonymity of the area
may increase and "result in people ignoring or less effectively
performing the guardianship activities that they might undertake
in less busy areas." 57 Like a cold traveling through an elementary
school, bars, clubs, and taverns are attractive places for potential
offenders.
Scientific studies confirm these common sense notions of
the susceptibility of violent crime in these places. In 1989, a
group of researchers published a report of their analysis of data
51. Id. at 7-2.
52. See Taylor, supra note 40, at 15.
53. Dennis W. Roncek & Pamela A. Maier, Bars, Blocks, and Crimes Revis-
ited: Linking the Theory of Routine Activities to the Empiricism of "Hot Spots, "29 CRIMi-
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concerning 4,589 residential blocks in San Diego, California to
determine the effect that taverns or bars had on a block 8.5  The
researchers found that for approximately every bar on a block,
another crime, especially a violent one, during the year would
occur.5 9 Strikingly, a block with at least one bar was five times
more likely to have a violent crime on it than blocks with no
bars.60
Additionally, a study of all residential blocks in Cleveland
from 1979 to 1981 revealed that "areas with recreational liquor
establishment have substantially more crime than areas without
them."6 Specifically, they found that "the amount of crime of
every type was significantly higher on residential blocks with tav-
erns or lounges than on others."62 In their evaluation of their
own findings, the researchers concluded that this high crime rate
is "more productively viewed in the context of routine activities
of individuals" rather than effects due to the use of alcohol.63
While this research cannot be generalized to every city, city offi-
cials should use this information and the information they gather
in their own city areas in order to determine whether some of
their city's violent crime is linked to the presence of bars, clubs,
and taverns. Part IV considers why the city government should
gather and use this information to protect its own city blocks.
58. Dennis W. Roncek & Mitchell A. Pravatiner, Additional Evidence that
Taverns Enhance Nearby Crime, in 73 SOCIOLOGY &Soc. REs. 185, 185 (1989). In
this study, the researchers used multiple regression analysis of data gathered in
1970 to determine their findings. Very little recent research has been con-
ducted concerning crime and place. Sociologists and politicians are only
recently beginning to make this topic a part of their dialogue in the United
States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. For recent discussions in the House
of Commons in London, England, see Liz Blackman, Licensed Premises, 363 HAN-
SARD 53-60WH (House of Commons Debates, Feb. 13, 2001), available at http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm20000l/cmindex/363/index-24.
htm#L.
59. See id. at 187 (The amount of crimes is about "one violent crime per
block if it has a bar on it. Two bars bring about two extra crimes, and three bars
about three .... Net of the other variables, each bar increases the violent
crime risk about sixty percent.").
60. Id. The researchers admit that their study had weaker regression
results than a 1981 Cleveland study because San Diego had far less crime on par
than did Cleveland. Id. Generally, blocks with higher crime were also nearer to
San Diego's downtown. Id.
61. Roncek & Maier, supra note 53, at 728. In their analysis of 4,396 indi-
vidual blocks, the researchers used multiple regression and tobit analysis to
control for variables like age, origin, overcrowding, and certain housing
characteristics.
62. Id. at 747.
63. Id. at 749.
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IV. THE CITY'S UNIQUE AND PARAMOUNT ROLE IN VIOLENCE
REDUCTION AROUND BARS, CLUBS, AND TAVERNS
The available resources and particular values each commu-
nity wishes to promote will shape the way each community uses
the information it gathers to respond to violent crime.64 Even
though both national and local research on the effectiveness of
risk-reducing programs remains weak and inconsistent,65 the cit-
ies have three key assets "to prevent and control violence: a new
platform for observation and intervention into the problem; new
data and analytic capabilities; and, most important, a new and
powerful constituency for acting on the problem."66 Conse-
quently, each community must be individually responsive and
creative in its approach to reduce its rates of violence if it wants
its prevention programs to be successful.
In 1993, the National Research Council and the Kennedy
School of Government held a conference to discuss how to
mobilize a response to violence in urban America.6" Their rec-
ommendations were based on four assumptions, one of which
was that "[v]iolence control initiatives must be as varied as the
contexts from which violence arises, and they must exploit the
strengths and address the needs that citizens recognize in their
own communities and families."68
The participants in the conference also appeared to follow
the effective approach of treating violence like a disease. The
participants' recommendations were based on the assumption
that "[b] ecause there are few antiviolence interventions that have
64. See Moore, Approaches to Prevention, supra note 1, at 238.
65. See discussion infra Part VII.B.
66. Moore, Approaches to Prevention, supra note 1, at 256-57.
67. For a summary of the conference, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
VIOLENCE IN URBAN AMERICA: MOBILIZING A RESPONSE (1994).
68. Id. at 6. These four assumptions include:
1. Reducing violence is a national priority not only because violence
injures and kills, but also because it imposes other high costs on
American society....
2. Responding effectively to violence requires recognizing and also
responding to the anger, fear, and despair it produces....
3. Violence control initiatives must be as varied as the contexts from
which violence arises, and they must exploit the strengths and
address the needs that citizens recognize in their own communities
and families. ...
4. Because there are few antiviolence interventions that have proven
consistendy effective in reducing violence, prudent public officials
must respond to violence more like medical researchers following
promising leads in a search for a cure than like physicians confi-
dently prescribing a proven therapy.
Id. at 5-9.
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proven consistently effective in reducing violence, prudent pub-
lic officials must respond to violence more like medical research-
ers following promising leads in a search for a cure than like
physicians confidently prescribing proven therapy."69 Given the
state of our knowledge of the causes of violent crime, city officials
must realize that an "infected" community needs to consider try-
ing various kinds of medicine, administered in various ways, in
order to determine the most effective treatment.
Among the conference participants' seven objectives in cre-
ating a plausibly effective response that mixed immediate, short-
term, and long-term efforts were (1) the mobilization of neigh-
borhoods to cooperate with police, (2) the reduction of violence
hazards, and (3) the promotion of a pro-social culture. y The
participants reported that these objectives could be met by creat-
ing opportunities for police-community collaboration in identify-
ing "hot spots" for violence, diagnosing the underlying problems,
and solving the problems by reclaiming public spaces from peo-•71
ple who create social disorder and violence.
Reclaiming areas overcome by such disorder is an important
step in removing the temptation to commit violent acts and in
promoting a pro-social culture. In conjunction with the fear that
violence creates, social and physical disorder cause businesses to
close and law-abiding people to avoid those areas thereby creat-
ing a social and economic vacuum. 72 Once the vacuum has been
created, much like a weakened and malnourished body being
more susceptible to sickness, individuals in such places are likely
to react with more violence because of the structurally imposed
conditions of social disorganization. 73 Reclaiming these areas,
69. Id. at 8-9.
70. See id. at 10. These seven objectives include:
1. promote a more effective criminal justice response to violence;
2. mobilize neighborhoods to cooperate with police in violence
prevention;
3. reduce violence hazards in communities;
4. strengthen supports for children and their families;
5. reduce violence in the home, which is both a problem in itself and
contributes to violence on the streets;
6. rebuild human and financial capital in communities weakened by
violence; and
7. promote a prosocial, less violent culture.
Id.
71. See id. at 19-24.
72. Id. at 21.
73. See Sampson & Lauritson, supra note 32, at 63 (citing R. KORNHAUSER,
SOCIAL SOURCES OF DELIQUENCY 20 (1978)). In a bar in Chicago's South Side,
residual values associated with deviant subcultures existed. These values
included "toughness," "getting big money," "going for bad," and "having fun."
252 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16
then, reduces violence by blocking the opportunity for the vio-
lence to occur in the first place.
The cities themselves play a crucial role in reducing the
nation's overall rate of violence through their use of the law and
law enforcement. In addition to using the assets described ear-
lier in this section, every city can, and should, use the law and law
enforcement to creatively attack violent crime and reclaim public
places that tend to encourage violence. "[T]he law is often an
important instrument of education as well as a device for author-
izing state intervention and control."74
Opportunity blocking, as described in Part I1, can be
achieved by making changes to the place, by changing the situa-
tion, or by building the changes into the targets themselves. This
approach is best achieved through local efforts. For example, a
city council could focus on the "place" by passing an ordinance
to criminalize the serving of alcohol past a certain time but allow
the bars to stay open for a few more hours in order to prevent
crowds from leaving at the same time.75 The city could then pass
an ordinance to force drinking establishments to train their
employees how to recognize and respond to the use of a fake
personal identification in order to renew their liquor licenses.
The city, as opposed to any kind of federal program, must use its
regulatory power, along with its direct research and enforcement
capabilities, to diagnose its problem areas, to prescribe an effec-
tive treatment, and to heal the wounds caused by the disease of
violence.
The police, like a properly used antibody, are also an impor-
tant part of any city's prescription. Part V explains possible ways
the city could effectively use law enforcement officers as a treat-
ment against violence.
V. POLICE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS
A. More Police and More Arrests?
Police could be used in several ways to prevent future crime.
Arguably, however, no one way has proven consistently effective
for all cities across the nation. The density of the population, the
See id. at 62 (citing E. ANDERSON, A PLACE ON THE CORNER 129-30, 152-58
(1978)). In this area, violence was expected and tolerated as a fact of life. See
id. at 62 (citing ANDERSON, supra, at 134).
74. Moore et al., Public Health Perspectives, supra note 19, at 205-06.
75. The state government could also play an important role. It can focus
on the person by printing holograms and other devices to prevent the opportu-
nity for underage individuals to use fake personal identification to get into the
bar in the first place.
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amount and density of violent criminal activity, the legitimacy of
the police within the community, the kinds of crime targeted,
and the targeted locations can all determine police effectiveness.
The city that chooses to use police in its violent crime prevention
strategy should determine the city's unique criminal environ-
ment through the information it gathers before allocating
resources to reduce violent crime.
Some cities may be able to effectively reduce violent crime
by increasing the number of police, especially if they target cer-
tain areas of the city. While evidence has been relatively weak,
some evidence demonstrates that increasing the number of
police officers causes reductions in crime the following year.
76
Increasing the number of police, however, is more effective in
large cities. 77 Whereas twenty-four crimes78 were prevented
annually for each additional officer in a big city, only four crimes
were prevented for each additional officer added throughout a
state.7 9 Increasing the number of police, therefore, may not be
an efficient strategy for every city. Each city should determine
how each new officer could be used and in what areas in order to
effectively reduce violent crime.
The federal government has been helping cities by funding
a national program to increase the number of police officers
throughout the nation. Under Title I of the Violent Crime Con-
trol and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the federal government
allocated money to pay for 100,000 new "community" police
officers through the year 2000.80 This new grant program soon
76. See Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Specification Problems, Police
Levels and Crime Rates, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 609 (1996). Marvell and Moody studied
fifty-six cities with populations over 250,000 people each in forty-nine states
over a twenty-year period. They then used the Granger test to analyze their
results, determining that more police, especially in higher crime cities, equals
less crime.
77. Marvell and Moody surmise that more police are effective in larger
cities because greater population and crime density in cities might make
changes in police presence more efficacious; criminals might be more likely to
substitute crime types outside cities; enlarging noncity forces, but not city
forces, prompts more complete reporting of crime; or perhaps criminals move
their crime activity out of town when police are added. See id. at 631.
78. These crimes included criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery,
assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
79. Id. at 632.
80. See M.A. Stapleton, Public's Crime Fears Justify Federal Act: Burns, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 28, 1994, at 1 (referring to Violent Crime Control & Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 §§ 1701-1709, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796dd-3796dd-8 (1994
& Supp. 2001)). The bill was amended in 1997 and 1998. Those amendments
did not impact the overall funding for the program. See 42 U.S.C. § 3793 (1994
& Supp. 2001). New appropriations for additional police officers were signed
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became known as the COPS program when the U.S. Department
of Justice created the Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS) to administer and fulfill the mandated objec-
tives of Title L81 The Act not only provided for more police, but
it also required cities to include, in their application for the
grant, "a long-term strategy and detailed implementation plan
that reflects consultation with community groups and appropri-
ate private and public agencies and reflects consideration of the
statewide strategy .... "82 In July of 2000, Vice-President Al Gore
proposed to increase the Clinton Administration's current pro-
gram funding from 100,000 to 150,000 new community police
officers.83 After significant debate and delay in Congress, Con-
gress finally extended funding of the COPS program until the
year 2007.84 The 1994 Act, former Vice-president Gore's propo-
sal, and the new appropriations for the COPS program suggest
that additional police alone are not an effective means to reduce
violence.
In addition to more police with a plan for prevention, police
officers can target certain petty disorders to reduce potential vio-
lence. In James Q. Wilson and George Kelling's article Broken
Windows, they espoused the now popular belief that increased
arrests for petty disorder will reduce the amount of serious
crime.85 This zero tolerance approach was used successfully, but
not perfectly, in New York City in the 1990s. "Serious crime in
New York City has declined dramatically since 1990, and the
decline has accelerated since the introduction of a set of new
police strategies beginning in 1994. The number of civilian com-
into law by President Bush on November 28, 2001. Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748 (2001). This bill provided total budget
authority of $1.1 billion per year for the next six years for the Office of Commu-
nity Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to assist state and local law enforcement
in collaboration with communities to improve public safety. Id.
81. For a thorough analysis of the COPS program through 1997, see JEF-
FREY A. ROTH ET AL., NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE COPS PROGRAM-TITLE I OF
THE 1994 CRIME ACT (2000).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd-1 (1994 & Supp. 2001).
83. Doyle McManus, Gore Says He'll Spend More to Fight Crime Prevention,
L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2262136.
84. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748
(2001).
85. WESLEY SKOGAN, DISORDER & DECLINE (1990) (citingJames Q. Wilson
& George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29).
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plaints against the police, however, rose dramatically after 1993,
remaining 40 percent above the 1993 level in 1998. "86
Other researchers have also supported the "broken win-
dows" theory: "[D]isorder undermines the processes by which
communities ordinarily maintain social control. Where disorder
problems are frequent and no one takes responsibility for unruly
behavior in public places, the sense of 'territoriality' among
residents shrinks to include only their own households." 7 Addi-
tionally, "areas that tolerate (or cannot effectively counter)
rowdy taverns .... public drinking .... and similar disorders will
certainly be plagued by crime."8 On the other hand, police, by
themselves, are unable to effectively reduce the extent of petty
disorder simply by enforcing the current laws.8 ° In Subpart B, I
explain how police officers need to work closely with the commu-
nity in order to monitor, identify, and appropriately respond to
disorder when and where policing would be most effective.
B. Community Policing
Because police have moved from the era of the well-con-
nected "beat cop" to the more efficient yet disconnected system
today, police must solicit the help of the community if they are to
attack disorder effectively.9° Without a more direct connection
to the citizens and their neighborhoods, police are unable to
86. See Roundtable, Law and Disorder: Is Effective Law Enforcement Inconsis-
tent with Good Police-Community Relations?, 28 Fo.DHAM URB. L.J. 363, 367 (2000).
These words were quoted by Ronald Tabak, the moderator of the roundtable,
from a March 1999 report of the Vera Institute ofJustice, entitled Respectful and
Effective Policing-Two Examples in the South Bronx. Mr. Tabak quoted:
These two trends ... have led many to speculate that the inevitable
price of the dramatic drop in crime is an aggressive police force that
generates more anger and resentment. This study by researchers at
the Vera Institute of Justice refutes such speculation, showing that
police commanders in at least two neighborhoods have been able to
reduce complaints against their officers below the 1993 levels while
experiencing the same dramatic decline in crime characteristic of the
city as a whole. The study shows that large reductions in crime can be
achieved while practicing respectful policing.
Id. at 367-68.
87. SKOGAN, supra note 85, at 10.
88. Id.
89. Police had significantly lost their power, by the mid-1970s, to make
"suspicious" arrests or freely pick up vagrants and loiterers. See id. at 87. In
addition, the Supreme Court recently struck down a municipal ordinance that
allowed police to arrest suspected gang members and their friends for not dis-
persing when ordered off of street corners. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527
U.S. 41 (1999).
90. For a more complete historical account of the gradual disconnection
of police from the community, see SKOGAN, supra note 85, at 85-89.
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observe and enforce petty disorder violations.9' Even if they
arrest a person for such a petty crime, "[tihe effects of an arrest
experience over a minor offense may permanently lower police
legitimacy, both for the arrested person and their social network
of family and friends."92 In this way, arrestees and their social
networks may become more defiant.93 In order to prevent this
defiance, police must substantially invest resources to regulate
public behavior in a polite manner that fosters rather than hin-
ders police legitimacy.94
This "radical departure from the era of 'professionalism' in
policing"95 is marked by the idea that police are less effective,
although possibly more efficient, when they claim a "monopoly
on the responsibility for crime control."96 Community policing,
in contrast, is a new professionalism in which "'police serve,
learn from, and are accountable to the community. Behind the
new professionalism is a governing notion: that the police and
the public are co-producers of crime prevention.'
Community policing arose from the crisis of police legiti-
macy after the urban race riots of the 1960s. Several reports
claimed police had lost contact with minority group residents,
both by changing from foot patrols to radio cars and by taking a
more legalistic approach to law enforcement.9" Citizen groups
urged the police to increase their contact with citizens in more
positive settings rather than merely respond to emergencies.99
Today, the goal of community policing is to reduce crime by
increasing the quantity and quality of police-citizen contact.'0 0
Community policing focuses on opening informal communica-
tion channels between police and citizens in order to understand
91. See id. at 87.
92. Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing for Crime Prevention, in UNIV. OF MD,
DEP'T OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS,
WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING 8-1, 8-25 (1997) [hereinafter Sherman,
Policing].
93. See id. (citing Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrele-
vance: A Theory of the Criminal Sanction, J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 445 (1993)).
94. See id. at 8-25.
95. Randolph M. Grinc, "Angels in Marble": Problems in Stimulating Commu-
nity Involvement in Community Policing, in COMMUNrrYJUSTICE 167, 171 (David R.
Karp ed., 1998).
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting JEROME H. SCOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE
LINE: POLICE INNOVATIONS IN SIX AMERICAN CITIES 212-13 (1986)).
98. Sherman, Policing, supra note 92, at 8-5 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION, supra note 92; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDER,
REPORT 1968).
99. See id.
100. See id. at 8-27, fig. 8-7.
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the problems and concerns in each particular neighborhood."'
The police then encourage citizens to play a more active role in
promoting public safety.'0 2 San Diego is one city that has suc-
cessfully used a community policing strategy to reduce crime
rates:
The police have been reorganized along neighborhood
lines. They also use a system of problem-solving policing
and have community groups that identify problems. The
police, with the community groups, explore what law
enforcement means might be used to solve the identified
problems. This might include civil remedies, such as trying
to take control of a crack house as a nuisance.... [T]here
are much better police-community relations [in San
Diego]. San Diego also uses a system that maps the crime
in the various districts.
10 3
In this way, community policing shifts the focus from crime fight-
ing to problem solving.
The federal government encouraged investment in commu-
nity crime prevention programs by allocating $6.1 billion for pro-
grams proposed by cities that applied between 1994 and 2000.104
One U.S. Attorney stated that the funding for community polic-
ing efforts was one of the more positive provisions of the Act.105
"Community policing is the way to go. Not only do you get more
officers, you get to see them .... To get control of violent crime,
you have to get more people and more families involved." ' 6
Despite these efforts by police, getting the community
actively involved in crime prevention can be extremely difficult
for city leaders and the police. In a study by the Vera Institute of
Justice evaluating Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing
(INOP) programs, the researchers found that all eight urban and
suburban cities that received INOP grants from the Bureau of
Justice Assistance in 1990 experienced extreme difficulty in get-
101. See SKOGAN, supra note 85, at 91-93.
102. Sankar Sen, Community Cop-I, Statesman (India),June 6, 2000, availa-
ble at 2000 WL 22267838.
103. Roundtable, supra note 86, at 366.
104. See Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act of 1994
§§ 1701-1709, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796dd-3796dd-8 (1994 & Supp. 2001). On May
12, 1999, the White House announced that the goal of funding 100,000 police
officers had been reached. Studies estimate that a total of $5.387 billion had
been awarded to innovative program support in order to reach this goal. See
JEFFREY A. ROTH ET AL., NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE COPS PROGRAM-TITLE I
OF THE 1994 CRIME Acr 9 (2000).
105. Stapleton, supra note 80, at 1.
106. Id.
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ting the community involved in their efforts to prevent crime.1
0 7
The study found that most of the community members lacked
sufficient knowledge about the programs initiated in their own
cities.108 Not only must police and community leaders do a bet-
terjob of disseminating information about their programs, they
must also make efforts to determine whether or not the commu-
nity wants to be in partnership with the police. "Data collected
from the eight INOP sites strongly suggest that community
residents generally have no interest in becoming involved in
community policing efforts."10 9
One of the reasons for the community's resistance to being
more actively involved in crime prevention programs stems from
the theory that some members of communities may often be
skeptical of calls from police for cooperation. "According to a
large number of community residents [in minority communi-
ties], a major reason why residents do not involve themselves
with community policing projects or are hostile to a police initia-
tive, is the historically poor relationship between the police and
the residents of poor, minority communities."'1 0 In order to win
the community's confidence and trust, "the police have to
demonstrate that they are sincere about seeking the community's
help in combating crime and disorder."" 1 While most citizens
are not opposed to law enforcement, they can resent partisan law
enforcement, especially if members of their social network are
being arrested for petty crimes." 2 Citizens in this kind of situa-
tion need assurance that enforcement is justified in particular
circumstances.
This historically poor relationship between the police and
the community further demonstrates the need for the police to
begin and continue to make positive contacts with the commu-
nity. In general, community policing attempts to transform
police officers from being agents of the law to being upholders of
community values."' While the 1997 Crime Prevention
107. Grinc, supra note 95, at 170.
108. Id. at 172-76.
109. Id. at 177.
110. Id. at 180.
111. Sen, supra note 102.
112. Other universal barriers to community policing include: high levels
of fear, skepticism that community policing will be anything but another short-
lived police program, the heterogeneous populations and disorganization that
often characterize communities, and intragroup conflict among community
leaders and residents. For a more detailed discussion of these barriers, see gen-
erally Grinc, supra note 95.
113. Sen, supra note 102.
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Report' 4 before Congress stated that neighborhood watches had
failed, the report stated that the most effective police-citizen con-
tacts included door-to-door police visits in priority settings used
to seek information, give out information, and promote police
legitimacy. 1 5 Community policing gives police the opportunity
to take action while responding to the community's values, mini-
mizing police over-reaction, reducing the fear of dealing with the
community in unfamiliar conditions, and enhancing police
responsiveness.
1. Problem-Oriented and Problem-Solving Policing
Community policing also incorporates the use of problem-
oriented policing. Because of accusations that problem-oriented
policing is not "real" police work, possibly because of its widely
used fluffy acronym (POP), the rhetoric of "problem-solving
policing" now dominates.16 Problem-oriented or problem-solv-
ing policing focuses on the hypothesis that "[t]he more accu-
rately police can identify and minimize proximate causes of
specific patterns of crime, the less crime there will be."" 7 Cur-
rently, problem-oriented policing focuses on separating potential
victims and offenders and removing criminogenic substances like
guns, cash, and other movable property.
118
In order to effectively remove victims from offenders and
their criminogenic substances, police must determine where they
are located. While police may be able to map the "hot spots"
after several acts of violence have occurred and been reported,
they may not be able to effectively prevent violence before it
occurs without the help of the community's citizens. In other
words, "community defined hot spots may be quite different
from police defined hot spots."" 9 Community members are val-
uable resources who are intimately connected to the area and
114. See discussion of report supra Part III.
115. See Sherman, Policing, supra note 92, at 8-19.
116. ROTH, COPS PROGRAM, supra note 81, at 200.
117. Sherman, Policing, supra note 92, at 8-32.
118. See id. at 8-30. Herman Goldstein, professor emeritus at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Law School in Madison, first articulated and later elaborated
on the concept of problem-oriented policing. See Herman Goldstein, Improving
Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 236 (1979); HER-
MAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (1990). The United States
Department of Justice now gives out Herman Goldstein Awards for Excellence
in Problem-Oriented Policing. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, EXCELLENCE
IN PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING: THE 1999 HERMAN GOLDSTEIN AwARD WINNERS
(1999).
119. Taylor, supra note 40, at 2.
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may be more aware of certain criminogenic substances that
could inevitably lead to violent crime.
The 1997 Crime Prevention Report stated that an effective
community policing program requires a clear focus of the city's
crime risk factor objective. 120 Once the objective is clear, the
police would need to enlist the help of small businesses, social
organizations, community groups, and non-criminal justice pub-
lic agencies to craft problem-specific solutions to crime problems
which would have the effect of democratizing crime preven-
tion. 121 The more precisely patrol presence is concentrated at
the "hot spots" at "hot times" of potential violent activity, the less
violence there will be in those places and times. 122 Unfortu-
nately, police chiefs may face enormous resistance from police
unions in changing work assignments to concentrate police in
high crime areas during normally high crime times from 7:00 pm
to 3:00 am during the week and all times during the weekend. 123
In addition to focusing on times and places, directed patrols
and programs targeted at removing criminogenic substances like
alcohol and guns can be effective in attacking crime hot spots. 124
One popular hypothesis about the declining homicide rate in the
United States is that police have become more effective at deter-
ring illegal gun-carrying in public places. 125 Whether or not this
theory is true, police must reach out to the community to effec-
tively prevent violence in each of their unique situations.
In addition to allowing the citizens of the community to take
a more active role in violence prevention, "people addressing
crime problems at places must know how to go about identifying
problems, analyzing the causes of the problems, crafting feasible
solutions, and determining if the problems have declined."126 A
manager of a local bar, for example, would need to be given the
appropriate means to gain such information for herself. She
would then need knowledge about what place-focused preven-
tion programs have been tried and which have been found to be
effective. She may decide her bar could sacrifice a little of its
120. See Sherman, Policing, supra note 92, at 8-38.
121. See Eck, supra note 41, at 7-45.
122. Sherman, Policing, supra note 92, at 8-14, fig. 8-4.
123. See id. at 8-44.
124. Id. at 8-38.
125. James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns; Forget Gun Control, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Mar. 20, 1994, at 46-47.
126. See Eck, supra note 41, at 7-45.
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class and switch, during certain times, to serving drinks in plastic
cups instead of glass.
12
The next section provides one successful example of how
the police used the citizens of the community to help them
through the process of effectively crafting solutions that actually
prevented future crime. While the specifics of the program will
certainly differ in each city, the example demonstrates how
important community policing can be when used properly.
2. An Example of Community Policing
12 s
Denver, Colorado is one city that allegedly has effectively
addressed their problems of youth violence through community
policing. "McGruff, the well-known crime prevention spokes-
dog," recently "commended the police and citizens of Denver for
their outstanding crime prevention efforts."1 29 A metro-wide
advisory committee was established to plan local training, iden-
tify additional needs, evaluate the effectiveness of effort, and
determine the standards for annual allocation of $1 million. The
advisory committee "updated its police officer evaluation stan-
dards to focus on problem identification and solving ability as
well as their ability to adhere to basic tenets of community polic-
ing."'"3 In addition to police efforts, "the city introduced the
SafeNite Curfew and Diversion Program in 1994 to reduce the
number of youth perpetrators and victims."131 In this program,
police take youth violating the citywide curfew to a SafeNite loca-
tion where they are ticketed by police and required to meet with
a counselor and parent or guardian. 132 Once the ticketed youth
completes a diversion program, the ticket is dismissed.1 33 "Since
the implementation of the curfew, the number of crime victims
where the suspect was a juvenile dropped by 40 percent."34
Along with the Diversion and Curfew program, Denver "intro-
duced a program to award $1 million grants to community orga-
127. For a list and analysis of other problem-solving tactics, see Roth,
COPS PROGRAM, supra note 81, at 203-14.
128. For specific analysis of specific tactics used in problem-solving and
implementing community policing, see WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET AL., PUBLIC
INVOLVEMENT: COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO (2000); WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET
AL., PROBLEM SOLVING IN PRACrICE: IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHI-
CAGO (2000).
129. McGruff Moves to Denver to Join Successful Crime Prevention Inititiatives,
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nizations and individuals who provide prevention services aimed
at reducing youth crime and violence." '135 By 1998, these pro-
grams "served more than 6,000 youths and 10,000 families, and
the city witnessed a 27 percent decrease in juvenile arrests in the
first three years of the program."136
A major tenet of the Denver program was to give the police
authority to prevent crime through the power of the law. Part VI
discusses several ways the law can be used to provide the appro-
priate individuals with the appropriate power to prevent future
violent crime.
VI. USING THE LAW TO PROBLEM-SOLVE
Social scientists often claim that "police make only minimal
contributions to crime prevention in the context of far more
powerful social institutions."1"7 Lawmakers, however, make up a
powerful institution that can play an active role in preventing vio-
lence. This Part discusses four ways the city's lawmakers could
attack and prevent violence.
In Subpart A, I suggest that lawmakers could zone an unde-
veloped area in such a way so as to limit the number of bars in a
predominantly residential neighborhood or encourage the con-
centration of bars in an entertainment district. If an area has
already been developed, lawmakers either could refuse to issue a
building permit if such refusal was based on a legitimate interest
sufficiently linked to the refusal of the permit or could force
businesses to relocate to another part of town.
13 8
In Subpart B, I suggest that lawmakers could use certain
mechanisms to induce the bar owner to undertake relevant pre-
vention measures if violence is already occurring in and around a
certain bar. One such inducement is nuisance abatement. "Nui-
sance abatement provides a threat in order to compel the instal-
lation of prevention." 139 In Macon, Georgia, a local newspaper
reported that "a club owner [could] be taken to court after ten
illegal acts of physical violence against persons or property on
the premises within a three-month period," if the "owner [has]
135. McGruff Moves to Denver to Join Successful Crime Prevention Inititiatives,
PR NEWSWiRE, Aug. 3, 2000 (on file with author).
136. Id.
137. Sherman, Policing, supra note 92, at 8-1.
138. Id. See also Stringfellow's Ltd. v. City of New York, 694 N.E.2d 407
(N.Y. 1998) (holding, among other things, that statute requiring adult business
to relocate if they are within 500 feet of another adult business is constitutional
under both state and federal constitution (citing Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres, 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976))).
139. See Eck, supra note 41, at 7-45.
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not made any reasonable attempt[s] at prevention."140 Local
councilpersons in Macon would like to reduce this number to
two such acts and adjust the penalties to include fines and/or
license suspension."'
In Subpart C, I suggest that lawmakers could close certain
streets in order to lessen traffic and prevent easy "get-aways" for
future violent offenders. Such street closures would require
extensive community involvement in order to best determine the
most effective strategy.
In Subpart D, I suggest that lawmakers could require certain
amounts of lighting in certain "hot spots" of the city that contain
many criminogenic substances. Such specification may also ben-
efit from extensive community participation.
A. Zoning
Zoning laws can be an effective means of controlling the risk
factors associated with violence. "Generally, zoning is a planning
tool for city government's management and control of growth
within its borders." '42 Specifically, zoning laws serve to limit the
owners' use of property. 143 Justice Marshall once observed,
"[Zoning] may indeed be the most essential function performed
by local government, for it is one of the primary means by which
we protect that sometimes difficult to define concept of quality of
life."144 Depending on a city's needs and particular characteris-
tics, city officials could, for example, limit bars to a few areas in
the city that can be effectively policed, or they may decide to
limit the density of bars and taverns in certain areas.
Municipal zoning is an exercise of the state's police power
through the state's enabling act.'45 After New York enacted the
first comprehensive zoning program in 1916, the Advisory Com-
mittee on Zoning, under Herbert Hoover, responded by issuing
140. Council to Crack Down on Nightclub Violence, AUGUSTA CHRON., July 11,
2000, at C11, available at 2000 WL 22702029.
141. Id. The municipal code was amended in September of 2000 and
reduced the number of illegal acts of physical violence to three. See MACON,
GEORGIA, CODE 1979, § 12-2019; Ord. No. 0-94-0035, 11-15-94; Ord. No. 0-94-
0039, 12-6-94; Ord. No. 0-00-0035, 9-20-00, http://fws.municode.com/
CGIBIN/om_isapi.dll?&softpage=gaGroupList.
142. Marcia Ann Johnson, Converting Walls to Bridges: A Review of the Pro-
posed Zoning Ordinance for the City of Houston, 18 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 231, 235
(1993).
143. Id. at 232.
144. Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
145. SeeWiLLtAM B. STOEBECK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
568-75 (West, 3d ed. 2000).
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the Standard Enabling Act [Standard Act] in 1922.146 All fifty
states, at one time or another, adopted the Standard Act.147 The
Standard Act empowers municipalities, along with other powers,
to "regulate and restrict . . .the percentage of lot that may be
occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the
density of population, and the location and use of buildings,
structures, and land ".... 148 The Act also requires:
[T]he regulation be "made in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the
streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers;
to promote health and the general welfare .... Such regu-
lations shall be made with reasonable consideration,
among other things, to the characteristic of the district and
its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to
conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the
most appropriate use of land throughout the
municipality." '149
The Act then gives the municipality the power to enforce
their zoning ordinances by issuing misdemeanors, punishable by
fine or imprisonment, as well as through the use of civil
penalties.
150
Not only are zoning ordinances limited by the power author-
ized by the enabling statute of the state, the Constitution also
places limits on the municipality's power to police its city. In
1922, the municipal government of Euclid, Ohio, zoned its city
into "six classes of use districts, denominated U-i to U-6, inclu-
sive." 151 In Euclidean zoning, U-1 districts allowed uses like sin-
gle-family dwellings and public parks. As the district number
increased, the uses were extended to places like restaurants, as in
the case of U-4, and manufacturing operations, as in the case of
U-6. 152 Even though the Village of Euclid's zoning code with-
stood Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion15 attacks in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme
Court recognized that a generally valid provision of an ordinance
could be held invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if
146. See id. at 571.
147. Id. at 960. The text goes on to explain that the Standard Act is still
in effect, with modification, in many of the states. Tailor-made statutes, how-
ever, have been enacted in California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
148. Id. at 961 (reprinting central sections of the Standard Act).
149. Id. (citing § 3 of the Standard Act).
150. Id. (citing § 8 of the Standard Act).
151. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1926).
152. Id. at 380. For a complete list of uses by district, see id. at 380.
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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applied unreasonably and arbitrarily.' 54 The Court further held
that the application of zoning ordinances might be upheld if
such application substantially relates to the health, safety, and
welfare of the city.'
55
In 1986, the Supreme Court held that zoning laws might
also be successfully attacked on First Amendment grounds if they
are a pretext for preventing free speech or any other First
Amendment right.156 Even a restriction that has such a pretext
can be upheld as long as it is a "content-neutral time, place, and
manner restriction" that serves a substantial governmental inter-
est and provides for reasonable alternative avenues of
communication.
1 5 7
Two traditional ways of zoning to prevent harmful secondary
effects include dispersal zoning and concentration zoning. In
New York City, the city passed and the courts upheld its Zoning
Resolution Amendments N 950384 that forbid adult businesses
within 500 feet of a school, church, residential district, or other
adult business.1 58 Such dispersal has been found to be an effec-
tive means of reducing crime, increasing property values, and
preventing urban blight that occurs when adult uses concen-
trate. 159 At this point, however, research on the effects of disper-
sal zoning in New York City is unavailable.
Concentration zoning, on the other hand, has been used to
limit adult uses to certain areas of the city in order to prevent the
proliferation of small red-light districts all around the city.160
Such zoning, arguably, allows the police and the community to
focus energy on a well-defined area of potential crime. Unfortu-
nately, this "combat zone" approach has proven to do more harm
than good in Boston where crime rose and property values
154. 272 U.S. at 395.
155. Id.
156. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986)
(holding that zoning laws restricting the location of movie theaters do not vio-
late the First Amendment unless they are a pretext for preventing free speech).
In addition to this holding, the Court left it to the factfinders to determine
whether zoning regulations are prompted by legitimate or improper factors.
157. See id. at 47 ("On the other hand, so-called 'content-neutral' time,
place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to
serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alterna-
tive avenues of communication.").
158. See Stringfellow's, Ltd. v. City of New York, 694 N.E.2d 407, 413 (N.Y.
1998).
159. See Steve McMillen, Adult Uses and the First Amendment: The Stringel-
low's Decision and its Impact on Municipal Control of Adult Businesses, 15 ToURo L.
REv. 241, 244 (1998).
160. Id. at 245.
266 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16
fell. 61 Only recently has Boston been able to redevelop these
areas and force the adult businesses to other locations. The City
of Boston has had to buy up and outbid adult businesses for the
property and refuse entertainment licenses to new adult busi-
nesses. 16 2 Boston is now focusing its redevelopment efforts on
creating areas with a mix of office, housing, hotel, and retail
establishments.
1 63
Palm Beach, Florida, is one example of a city using its zon-
ing ordinances to constitutionally control violence. Its zoning
codes restrict restaurants and bars to commercial areas. 16 4 In
these areas, "bars and lounges cannot be within 600 feet of a resi-
dential area unless commissioners grant a permit following a
public hearing."16 5 Unfortunately, the zoning ordinances do not
provide measures to control nightclubs. Recent violence and res-
idential complaints have increased around the nightclubs that
dot the city's landscape. "By creating a zoning classification for
nightclubs, city officials could prevent such problems and lessen
nearby residents' complaints .... [N] ightclubs likely would have
rules similar to adult entertainment establishments, which are
not allowed within 1,000 feet of a residential area or place of
worship." 16 6 Whether an additional 400 feet will prevent any vio-
lence has not been determined. Businesses and local govern-
ments need scientific information about the effectiveness of
crime prevention programs in order to make effective prevention
decisions.
Zoning boards should also ensure that safety- rather than
prejudice, motivates their decision to zone the city in a certain
way. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs may be able
to successfully challenge zoning ordinances by showing that
racial prejudice at least partially motivated a zoning decision.
6 7
Courts in such cases often apply strict scrutiny in considering the
161. Scott Van Voorhis, Lafeyette Center Could Fetch $140M, BOSTON HER-
ALD, Aug. 21, 2001, at 29, available at 2001 WL3808987.
162. Paul Restuccia, Midtown Moves into New Zone; Projects Will Enhance
Streetscapes, BOSTON HERALD, July 27, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3807001.
163. Id.
164. Susan Colavecchio, Boynton to Create Nightclub Definition, PALM BEACH
POST, Sept. 5, 2000, at lB.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 271 (1977) (holding that the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrat-
ing race as a motivating factor of the zoning decision; once proven, the burden
shifts to the defendant to prove that the same decision would have been
reached without such a motivating factor).
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validity of the zoning ordinance where the burden shifts to the
defendant to show that such ordinances are "suitably tailored to
serve a compelling state interest." '168 In addition to racial
prejudice, plaintiffs have also successfully challenged zoning
ordinances on Equal Protection grounds where socioeconomic
reasons are the basis for the specific zoning decisions.
169
In a recent law review article challenging governmental
restraints as specifically and directly harmful to black leisure and
reinforcing social inequality, Regina Austin confronts the use of
laws, regulations, and governmental actions that privatize public
space.170 She argues that "governmental restraints very often
ignore the significance of public leisure to blacks and underesti-
mate the harm restraints cause."1 71 For example, Austin points
out that "bars, clubs, and restaurants that are black-owned or that
cater to a black clientele have allegedly been denied licenses to
operate, forced to close because of license infractions, or sub-
jected to extraordinary police surveillance under circumstances
that proprietors believe are motivated by discriminatory hostility
to black leisure pursuits." '172 While these attacks are easily over-
come in a court of law by research that demonstrates safety and
breach of peace reasons, a city should be aware of the stereotypes
that may subconsciously affect zoning decisions and the potential
long-term adverse side effects of restraining blacks from their
traditional leisure activities. Austin argues that governmental
entities should balance their restraints with the creation of alter-
native programs and facilities for leisure and recreation73
168. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985):
These factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legiti-
mate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the
burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For these
reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon recti-
fied by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and
will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.
Id.
169. Marcia Ann Johnson, Converting Walls to Bridges: A Review of the Pro-
posed Zoning Ordinance for the City of Houston, 18 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 231,
238-39 (1993).
170. See generally Regina Austin, "Not Just For the Fun of It!": Governmental
Restraints on Black Leisure, Social Inequality, and the Privatization of Public Space, 71
S. CAL. L. REv. 667 (1998).
171. Id. at 670.
172. Id. at 675.
173. Id. at 677.
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Along with zoning, a city may be able to require bars to com-
ply with certain management and employee training in order to
renew their liquor licenses. Subpart B explores such an option.
B. Management and Employee Training
As discussed in Part III of this Note, research literature con-
sistently points to the relationship between the presence of bars
and violent crime in the surrounding area. While most bars may
be relatively crime free, a few bars may be hot spots of crime.
174
"The behavior of bartenders and bouncers may contribute to vio-
lence in these places175 and changes in bar management prac-
tices (from server training to changes in the legal liability of
bartenders) may reduce [violence]. " a76
Because research in the United States in this area of the law
is practically non-existent, Australia's success in this area may
serve as the best example to use in this country. At least two
towns in Australia created agreements among pub managers,
along with other tactics, to improve the training of bouncers,
reduce crowds of youth, and improve relationships with
police. 177 One Australian program "evaluation examined serious
assaults in downtown pubs for the year before and four years
after the management accord, and compared these changes to
the same period for six other cities in the same state. Serious
assaults declined 40.5 percent in the target city but increased
14.3 percent in the control cities."' 78 City officials in the United
States may be able to use their licensing power or other liquor
and dram shop laws as leverage to require managers, servers, and
174. See discussion supra Part III and Eck, supra note 41.
175. Eck, supra note 41, at 7-20.
176. Sandra L. Putnam et al., Methodological Issues in Community-Based Pro-
gram Effects, in 14 CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE PREVENTION MONOGRAPH 31
(Thomas K. Greenfield & Robert Zimmerman eds., 1993). The researchers
studied a community intervention program in Rhode Island where, along with
other tactics, the city used economic incentives and disincentives through the
use of dram shop legal liability as a lever for server training and responsibility.
While alcohol arrests increased during the interventions, presumably from
increased enforcement by police, assault injuries dropped twenty-one percent
as compared to a four percent increase in the comparison communities. See id.
at 36.
177. Eck, supra note 41, at 7-20 (citing Ross Homel et al., Preventing Alco-
hol-Related Crime Through Community Action: The Surfers' Paradise Safety Action Pro-
ject, in 7 CRIME PREVENTION STUD. (Ross Homel ed., 1997)).
178. Id. at 7-21 (citing Marcus Felson, et al., A Community Policing Initiative
to Discourage Abuse of Alcohol, in 7 CRIME PREVENTION STUD. (Ross Homel ed.,
1997)).
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bouncers of certain "hot spot" bars, clubs, and taverns to com-
plete similar training.
Along with regulation of the bars themselves, regulation of
the streets surrounding these establishments may also provide an
effective way to reduce the opportunity for violent crime. Sub-
part C explores how street closures around violent neighbor-
hoods can serve as good examples for street closures around
bars, clubs, and taverns.
C. Street Closures
City officials, with community support and involvement, may
also be able to close certain high-traffic streets near bars, clubs,
and taverns in "hot spot" areas to prevent future violence.
Research concerning street closures in residential areas is fairly
reliable and conclusive. "Research has suggested that areas with
easy access have more crime than areas with street layouts that
restrict access." '179 In one neighborhood in Dayton, Ohio, the
city officials subdivided streets into small areas so no one could
drive directly through the area.18 ° Police-reported crime statis-
tics showed that while crime in the surrounding city rose one
percent, violent crime in the target neighborhood declined fifty
percent. 81 In addition to less violent crime, thirty-nine percent
of the residents in the neighborhood said they knew their neigh-
bors better and forty-five percent felt safer.1 82 Housing values
also increased fifteen percent after having declined prior to the
street closings compared to a four percent increase in the sur-
rounding region.183
"In 1990, the Los Angeles Police Department installed traffic
barriers on [fourteen] streets in a South Central Los Angeles
neighborhood with a high level of drug activity, shootings and
homicides." '' 84 Using the surrounding neighborhoods as control
areas, the researchers found that the net effect of the installation
of the barriers was a sixty-five percent decrease in homicides."8 5
179. Eck, supra note 41, at 7-33 (citing Garland F. White, Neighborhood
Permeability and Burglary Rates, in 7 JusT. Q. 57 (1990); Daniel J.K. Beavon et al.,
The Influence of Street Networks on the Patterning of Property Offenses, in 2 CRIME
PREVENTION STUD. (Ronald V. Clarke ed., 1994)).
180. Oscar Newman, Creating Defensible Space, U.S. DEP'T HOUSING &
URBAN DEv. 31-63 (1996)).
181. Id. at 55.
182. Id. at 55-56.
183. Id. at 55.
184. Eck, supra note 41, at 7-34 (citingJames R. Lasley, Using Traffic Barri-
ers to "Design Out" Crime: A Program Evaluation of LAPD's Operation Cul-De-Sac
(November 1996).
185. Id.
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"Two years following the installation of these barriers, the barri-
ers were abandoned and then removed as the police became
embroiled in the controversy surrounding the Rodney King beat-
ing." "' Total violent crimes 18 7 declined eight percent during
the first year and thirty-seven percent during the second year the
barriers were in place.'88 Once the barriers were removed, homi-
cides rose 800% compared to the surrounding neighbor-
hoods.
189
Simply stated, street closures in residential neighborhoods
are effective. The promising preventative power of street clo-
sures may be a result of the increased difficulty for escape. In the
case of "prostitution cruising" and drive-by shootings, the offend-
ers are also likely to use the easy access to streets by following
circular patterns in their search for targets.
1 90
In contrast to homeowners welcoming reduced traffic in
their neighborhoods, bar and tavern owners would likely resist
street closings. Late-night leisure establishments depend on
their ability to attract the public to their businesses. If receiving
community approval is difficult, city officials may want to only
close streets in entertainment districts where pedestrians can
walk freely from club to bar and back. If the officials worked
closely with bar owners in neighborhoods, they may also be able
to limit traffic creatively and effectively without significantly
reducing the establishments' profits. By blocking easy access and
escape routes and thus making criminal activity more inconve-
nient, city officials may be able to reduce criminal activity, espe-
cially violent criminal activity.
D. Lighting
In the 1997 Crime Prevention Report, the commission con-
cluded that the research and data were inconclusive as to
whether street lighting was an effective approach in the reduc-
tion and deterrence of crime. The few studies found by the com-
mission related to the effect of lighting on crime in London,
England' and Glasgow, Scotland."9 2 In addition to the studies
186. Id.
187. Violent crimes in this study include homicide, rape, street robbery,
aggravated assault, and purse snatching.
188. See Eck, supra note 41, at 7-35 (citing James R. Lasley, Using Traffic
Barriers to "Design Out" Crime: A Program Evaluation of LAPD's Operation Cul-De-Sac
(November 1996)).
189. Id. at 7-34.
190. Id. at 7-35.
191. Id. at 7-31 (citing Stephen Atkins et al., The Influence of Street Lighting
on Crime and Fear of Crime, in CRIME PREVENTION UNIT PAPER 28 (1991); Kate
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being done in different countries with different criminal cul-
tures, the research also lacked control groups to compare the
drop in the levels of crime. The researchers were unable to con-
clude whether the lighting prevented or increased crime as
offenders also used lighting to detect potential targets and assess
low-risk situations.'9 3 Despite the weak evidence related to light-
ing, city officials could explore the use of lighting and use their
regulatory powers to require establishments in "hot spot" areas to
install effective lighting fixtures.
Because lighting is not a proven treatment for the disease of
violent crime, city officials must act more like medical research-
ers in their search for effective treatment. While all of these
place-focused preventative measures may look appealing, each
individual city may face certain unique obstacles in their efforts
to reduce and prevent violent crime. Part VII explores how
actual displacement and the fear of displacement may prevent
lawmakers from making effective changes. Additionally, Part VII
explores how limited scientific research prevents lawmakers from
effectively persuading the community that any change would be
beneficial.
VII. OBSTACLES TO PLACE-FOCUSED PREVENTION
A. Fear of Displacement
One reason for current community resistance to place-
focused prevention is the fear of the displacement of crime from
the target places to other, presumably safer, locations nearby.
The 1997 Crime Prevention Report explained:
Displacement can take on a number of forms. Offenders
can change locations. They can change the times of
offending. They can change the target of their criminal
behavior. They can adopt new behaviors to attack the
same targets. And they can switch the type of crime they
commit. Fear of displacement is often based on the
assumption that offenders are like predatory animals
194
Painter, The Impact of Street Lighting on Crime, Fear, and Pedestrian Use, 5 SEC. J. 116
(1994)).
192. Id. (citing Jason Ditton & Gwyneth Nair, Throwing Light on Crime: A
Case Study of the Relationship Between Street Lighting and Crime Prevention, 5 SEC. J.
125 (1994)).
193. Id. (citing R. Fleming &J. Burrows, The Casefor Lighting as a Means of
Preventing Crime, REs. BuLL., REs. & PLAN. UNrr, No. 22, 14 (1997)).
194. See Eck, supra note 41, at 7-40.
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While there is no evidence to suggest that these preventive
programs actually increase overall crime by displacing it, the
research suggests that some displacement does occur. However,
the 1997 Crime Prevention Report noted that "[r]eviews of
empirical studies examining place-focused prevention, police
enforcement, and other preventative tactics in the United States,
Canada, Great Britain, continental Europe and Australia find
that... when displacement occurs, it does not overwhelm other
gains from blocking crime opportunities."195 Additionally, one
evaluation concluded that "[r]esearchers have documented that
as a result of situational crime prevention initiatives less than one
crime is displaced . .. for each crime prevented." '96 Unfortu-
nately, most preventative evaluations do not report possible dis-
placement effects. "It is possible that more displacement would
be found if evaluators were more diligent in their search for
it."197
On the other hand, some research shows that reduced vio-
lent crime in one area may also reduce crime in the surrounding
area. "In some instances, adjoining areas may experience a diffu-
sion of benefits ... , enjoying enhanced safety only because they
are near a prevention site." '98 As broken windows and social dis-
order attract criminals, 199 potential offenders around organized
neighborhoods may be uncertain of the scope of prevention
efforts and, hence, avoid both the blocked opportunities and the
similar nearby unblocked opportunities.200
195. Id. (citing D. Cornish & R.V. Clarke, Understanding Crime Displace-
ment: An Application of Rational Choice Theory, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 933 (1987); Rob-
ert Barr & Ken Pease, Crime Placement, Displacement, and, Deflection, in 12 CRIME
AND JUST.: REv. RESEARCH (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1990);John E.
Eck, The Threat of Crime Displacement, 25 CRIM.JusT. ABSTRACTS 527 (1993); Rene
Hessling, Theft from Cars: Reduced or Displaced?, 3 EUR. J. CRIM. POL'Y & RES. 79
(1995)).
196. Taylor, supra note 40, at 15.
197. See Eck, supra note 41, at 7-40.
198. Taylor, supra note 40, at 15 (citing R.V. Clarke and D. Weisburd,
Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the Reverse of Displacement, in 2
CRIME PREVENTION STUD. 165 (R.V. Clarke ed., 1994).
199. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
200. See Newman, supra note 180, at 56. The immediate areas surround-
ing the intervention neighborhood also saw reductions in crime. The Dayton
police explained that criminals and their clients knew that "the residents of Five
Oaks [had] taken control of their streets, but because they did not know the
neighborhood's exact boundaries, they moved out of the surrounding commu-
nities as well." Id.
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B. Limited Scientific Research
Another obstacle to creating place-focused prevention laws
lies in the lack of scientific research in this area of the law.
Despite the potentially effective measures described in Sections V
and VI, these programs still lack a significant amount of scientifi-
cally valid information. "Any counting system involves some valu-
ative institutional processing of people's observations and reports
of what they perceive as events. Any set of crime statistics, ihere-
fore, is not based on some objectively observable universe of
behavior."2 ° 1 Considering this limitation, city officials may not
be able to apply another city's successful approach to their own
because of each city's unique characteristics.
Scientific research may also suffer other limitations. Deter-
mining whether injuries were actually due to "violent" behavior
(rather than accidents), whether violent offenders are actually
reported and arrested, and whether the same offender has been
arrested more than once are important questions that research
often fails to measure.2" 2 Additionally, displacement and diffu-
sion effects themselves may not be taken into account in violent
criminal research. Scientific evidence is also limited by the lack
of denominators (i.e., "this many" people were victims, but "how
many" people in the place were not victims) and an inherent
inability to link cause and effect.
20 3
At this point, spending money to gather such information
may be more productive than directly funding preventative pro-
grams. The research for such information must enlist the active
participation of the people and organizations that own and con-
trol places. While some basic research can be undertaken using
police records, public databases, and surveys, most systematic
evaluations and experimentations involving changes to the char-
acteristics of places will require the cooperation of the commu-
nity's businesses, property owners, and other residents.
As community members begin to organize around common
goals, the vibrancy of the community is benefited. Just as violent
crimes act as a disease to the community, an active and pro-social
environment can be the "boost" that promotes the community's
health beyond simply getting rid of any disease. Part VIII further
201. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIO-
LENCE 404 (AlbertJ. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993).
202. See generally id. at 406-11. The editors describe one interesting
example in the National Crime Survey where men and women respondents
indicated that they did not regard simple assaults at home, at work, or in bars to
be crimes. Id. at 420.
203. See id. at 417.
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demonstrates the importance of the vibrancy of the community
and of promoting the dignity of the human person as these val-
ues are balanced against whatever laws and law enforcement the
city officials use to prevent violent crime.
VIII. IMPORTANCE OF A VIBRANT COMMUNITY AND
HUMAN DIGNITY
The increased restrictions and enforcement described in
Sections V and VI must be balanced with the city officials' desire
to create a vibrant nightlife that encourages the community to
interact and enjoy themselves and promotes the dignity of the
human person. A recent statement of Catholic Bishops of the
United States explained, "We believe the human person is social.
Our dignity, rights, and responsibilities are lived out in relation-
ships with others .... "204 Likewise, subsidiarity20 5 and solidarity
recognize:
[H]uman dignity and human rights are fostered in com-
munity. Subsidiarity calls for problem-solving initially at
the community level: family, neighborhood, city, and state.
It is only when problems become too large or the common
good is clearly threatened that larger institutions are
required to help .... Solidarity recognizes that "we are all
really responsible for all."
20 6
In this way, preventing individuals from committing violent
crimes where they may not have committed them if the situation
was different promotes human dignity, vibrant nightlife, and safe
community.
As stated in Part I, violent crimes cause individuals of a com-
munity to avoid perceived "hot spots." Not only will people avoid
bars, clubs, and taverns (especially at night), but they will also
limit their interpersonal relationships and communication pat-
terns.207 This kind of avoidance results in a more disconnected
community and damages its vibrancy.
204. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, RESPONSIBILITY,
REHABILITATION, AND RESTORATION: A CATHOLIC PERSPECrIVE ON CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (November 15, 2000), at http://www.nddbuscc.org/sdwp/
criminal.html.
205. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2279 (1986)
("subsidiarity: .. . (2) a theory of sociology: functions which subordinate or
local organizations perform effectively belong more properly to them than to a
dominant central organization.")
206. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 204
(quoting John Paul I, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (Washington, D.C.: United States
Catholic Conference, 1987), no. 38).
207. Miethe, supra note 7, at 23.
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Baltimore is one city that is trying to find the right balance
of violence prevention and community interaction to create a
safe and vibrant nightlife. "While party-until-dawn nightlife is
reviving the travel industry in New York, New Orleans and Miami,
several influential leaders [in Baltimore] say the city has been
slow to recognize the trend, costing it 'tens of millions of dol-
lars." 2°s Some legislatures are preparing to push a two-pronged
nightlife agenda through their city hall and state house. 2°9 They
would like to permit more after-hours clubs that charge admis-
sion and play music but do not serve alcohol. They would also
like to permit alcohol to be served in certain downtown locations
until 4 a.m., rather than the current 2 a.m. closing time. Cur-
rently, establishments that want to stay open during the early
morning "must receive a 'conditional use' permit from the zon-
ing board, which will be issued only if the club adheres to 'public
health, security, general welfare and moral' standards.
210
In Seattle, Washington, neighborhood activists, city officials,
and responsible nightclub owners are trying to work together to
create a fair and formal process for allowing businesses to add
entertainment to their normal business of providing food and
beverage.211 "At the heart of the current debate are the more
difficult questions of balancing rights with responsibilities, civil-
liberties protections[,] and crime prevention."2 1 2 Even after one
year of study by a council-appointed task force, key issues still
remain unresolved:
The council needs airtight language for identifying the
nexus between club operations and behavior of its patrons.
Overservice of liquor at a dance club that leads to drunken driv-
ing, fights [,] or gunfire is an obvious and direct effect of misman-
agement. When the conduct of a business can be tied directly to
an egregious pattern of illegal behavior, the grounds for punish-
ing a club are clear.
213
City officials, however, may have difficulty revoking a license
based on what a business fails to do near, but off of, its premises.
Despite municipal ordinances of one city that require business
owners to remove snow, ice, and other dangerous and hazardous
208. Tim Craig, City Tourism Boosters Covet All-Night Dollars: Current Laws
Stand in Way of Expanding Nightlife Until 6 a.m., BALTIMoRE SUN, Apr. 28, 2000, at
1A, available at 2000 WL 4865371.
209. Id.
210. Id.




276 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16
conditions from any public right of way adjacent to their prop-
erty,214 the Court of Appeals in Washington found, "No authority
declares that [the liquor license holder] had a legal duty, or even
a legal right, to control third party conduct on city-owned prop-
erty. '215 The court, however, did not preclude the city from cre-
ating such a legal duty or right in the future.
Even if the city does not create such a duty, the city may be
able to hold the owner of a bar, club, or tavern responsible for
activities outside of the establishment if activities inside the estab-
lishment lead to the violence on nearby public areas. The lan-
guage of the law must reasonably associate the problem behavior
on nearby public streets with the entertainment activities in
order to hold such owners liable for the violence. 216 Whether
drive-by shootings outside of the club or assaults in the back alley
that do not involve patrons are suffering associated to the bar
activity are issues the ordinance should address when determin-
ing which problem behaviors will count against the club
owner.217 In this way, legitimate scientific research may provide
the reasonable nexus to uphold such ordinances in court.
The Buckhead Village nightlife district in Atlanta, Georgia,
is also facing problems of lawlessness and violence. "People are
attracted by the concentration of clubs and restaurants, so entre-
preneurs come along and open more. To a point, that's good,
because the variety of offerings keeps the area fresh and desira-
ble. Beyond that point, however, things can get out of con-
trol. '2 18 One editorial writer demands, "Club and restaurant
owners should be responsible for maintaining order within their
establishments . . . but only city police have the authority to
enforce the laws on the streets and sidewalks outside."
219
214. See TAcoMA, WASH. MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 9.16.050, 9.17.010 (1998).
215. S & S Market, Inc. v. Liquor Control Bd., 828 P.2d 1154, 1158
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
216. See Moreland v. Cheney, 479 S.E.2d 745 (Ga. 1997):
There was evidence presented to the trial court of numerous, perva-
sive problems that were generated by, and occurred in and around,
the lounge. These problems included the illegal sale of alcohol to
adults and minors; the illegal dealing of drugs; the outbreak of numer-
ous fights, including gunfights; and the creation of significant traffic
congestion, loud music, and littering. Having reviewed the record, we
conclude that there was ample evidence presented to the trial court to
authorize it to find that the Countdown Lounge constituted a
nuisance.
Id. at 745-46.
217. See generally id.
218. Buckhead Needs Tighter Controls, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 4, 2000, at 18A.
219. Id.
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One urban planner and architect recently expounded on
the need for increased connectivity, walkable communities, and
sustained and mixed-use areas. 220 "[He] advocates mixed-use
and multi-used developments, where he said 'the diversity of uses
is conducive to vibrant and mutually enhancing daytime and
nighttime activities.' ' 221 Boston is one major city that is cur-
rently focusing its efforts to reduce the violence in its "combat
zone" with its focus on mixed-use areas. This diversity of uses
generally includes three or more mutually supporting, revenue-
generating uses, such as office, residential, retail, restaurants,
hotels, and others; significant physical and functional integra-
tion, including 'pedestrianization'; and developed in conformity
with a coherent plan.
222
Zoning bars, clubs, and taverns to create isolated and safe
places for late-night leisure activities may also face the problem
of its potential discriminatory exclusionary effects. 223 In order to
prevent such side effects, city officials should use their zoning
codes to (1) allow the kind of leisure activities that thrive in cer-
tain neighborhoods and communities, (2) ensure that isolating
leisure activities will not be so inconvenient for the communities
to which they are geared that they will cease to be profitable, (3)
be relatively easy and inexpensive to administer, to minimize the
number of businesses that will be detrimentally effected by these
changes, (4) socioeconomically integrate the already divided
neighborhoods within the cities, and (5) facilitate the considera-
tion of legitimate local concerns and police effectiveness.
2 24
Because of these considerations, zoning codes should be devel-
220. Noted Architect Pushes for Mixed-Use Development, 'Connectivity' in Urban
Plan, Bus. WORLD, Jan. 6, 2000, at 21.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See discussion supra Part VI.A.
224. MarciaJohnson argues for the use of inclusionary zoning to counter-
act the damaging effects of exclusionary zoning in housing:
An effective inclusionary zoning program should address at least five
goals: (1) it should create as much low and moderate or affordable
housing as possible with a view toward meeting the city's need, (2) it
should not give rise to counterproductive side effects, (3) it should be
relatively easy and inexpensive to administer, to minimize delays and
development costs, (4) it should socioeconomically integrate the sub-
urban communities in the process and (5) it should facilitate the con-
sideration of legitimate social concerns.
Johnson, supra note 169, at 252 (citing Advisory Commission on Regulatory Bar-
riers to Affordable Housing, Not in My Backyard, COMM'N ON REMOVING BARIERS
To AFFORDABLE HOUSING. Washington: 1991 at 1-2, Report to Pres. Bush & Sec.
Kemp).
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oped particularly for each community based on the assembled
research.
CONCLUSION
Healing the wounds of violence and promoting the vitality
of the community requires a community-specific diagnosis and a
treatment that combines both the public health and criminal jus-
tice models of violence prevention. Effective prevention pro-
grams require the combined resources of citizens, governmental
regulation, and law enforcement. Planning intervention strate-
gies oriented toward bars, clubs, and taverns begins with an
understanding of the risk factors in places in the general commu-
nity.225 In general, institutional instability and the isolation of
community institutions are key factors underlying the structural
dimensions of social disorganization.226 City officials can pro-
mote community vibrancy and human dignity while reducing vio-
lence by reorganizing "hot spots" near bars, clubs, and taverns. If
they utilize their community resources to first, determine the risk
factors and workable solutions, and second, institute preventative
measures, violence can be reduced and community vibrancy and
human dignity can be improved.
225. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIO-
LENCE 146 (AlbertJ. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993) (referring to inter-
vention strategies to locations in general).
226. Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Violent Victimization and
Offending: Individual-, Situational-, and Community-Level Risk Factors, in 3 UNDER-
STANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 59 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth
eds., 1993).
